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Are Cooperatives Efficient When 
Membership Is Voluntary? 
Howard D. Leathers 
If profit-maximizing farmers are free to join  or not to join  a cooperative, it may 
appear reasonable to assume that a cooperative will exist only when it has cost 
advantages over non-cooperative marketing. This paper presents a model in which 
that result fails. Every individual farmer chooses either to join  or not join  a 
cooperative depending on  whether transactions costs are lower from cooperative 
membership or nonmembership.  As cooperative membership  increases, transactions 
costs for members decline, but for nonmembers these costs increase. Results of this 
analysis reveal that an  equilibrium exists in which all farmers voluntarily choose to 
join the cooperative, but more than half of the members wish the cooperative had not 
been formed, and transactions costs in the aggregate are  higher with the cooperative 
than without it. 
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Introduction 
This study draws upon two important elements of the literature on agricultural cooper- 
atives: (a)  cooperatives are formed by the individual decisions of farmers to join or not 
join (e.g., see Karantininis and Zago, 2001; Sexton, 1986);  and (b)  net farm returns may 
be different for cooperatives and investor-owned marketing firms because of differences 
in transactions costs between the two institutional arrangements, and therefore one 
reason farmers form cooperatives is to reduce transactions costs (Cook, 1994; Sykuta 
and Cook, 2001). If farmers base their decisions to join  a cooperative solely on net 
returns, one is tempted to conclude that cooperatives will thrive only when they have 
a transactions cost advantage over investor-owned firms. Using a recent model set forth 
by Dixit (2003), this study explores a situation in which this conclusion is incorrect, 
i.e., transactions costs are higher in the cooperative, but farmers voluntarily join the 
cooperative. 
The notion that the institutional arrangements of agricultural production and mar- 
keting evolve in such a way as to minimize production, marketing, and transactions 
costs arises from the insights of  Coase (1937) and Williamson (1985). Moreover, it is 
perfectly reasonable to ask: If there are no barriers to protect these arrangements from 
competition, how could an institutional arrangement that was inefficient (or less effi- 
cient than some alternative arrangement) develop and survive? 
Dixit (2003) provides a possible answer to this question by developing a model of 
club formation "with entrapment." In the current paper, the Dixit model is applied 
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to cooperatives in order to draw the following conclusions: (a)  individual farmers may 
join a cooperative even though their transactions costs would be lower if no cooperative 
were formed, and (b)  cooperatives may form even when the aggregate transactions costs 
of  -  farmers  - -  --  are higher  -- -  with  -  the cooperative than without it. 
The logic behind these results is this: As more farmers in an  area  join the cooperative, 
the cooperative becomes more efficient, and the per farmer costs of marketing through 
the cooperative decline; at the same time, as more farmers in an area join the cooper- 
ative, it  becomes more difficult for nonmembers to find buyers. When this occurs, there 
can be an equilibrium in which all farmers  join the cooperative even though most of the 
farmers prefer there were no cooperative. 
In order to focus on transactions costs, this analysis deliberately assumes a simple 
production process with fixed cost and  fixed output. Therefore, the  farm-level production 
is independent of  the choice of  institutional arrangements for marketing. Here we 
assume the institutional arrangements for marketing arise endogenously as  a result of 
the choices made by individual farmers. Each farmer faces the decision about whether 
to join a cooperative and market her output through the cooperative, or to sell inde- 
pendently to a private, investor-owned firm. 
Reasons for Joining a Cooperative 
The farmer's decision about whether to join a cooperative is assumed to be made solely 
on the basis of  economic considerations. Specifically, does the farmer expect to make 
more  money  from joining  or from not joining  the cooperative? Before proceeding, 
however, we note that early agricultural economics literature on cooperatives put a 
substantial emphasis on non-economic motivations for membership. In his early work 
on cooperative marketing, Nourse (1922) wrote of  the need for a spirit of  cooperation 
among farmers, stating they should not rely solely on monetary incentives for their 
cohesiveness. Tobriner (1924, p. 369) recognized both economic motivation (''the  farmer 
joins the association ... in order to get more money"), and non-economic motivation ("or 
he  joins because he is afraid to brave the social ostracism of the farmers who do become 
members"), but saved his greatest approbation for a spiritual motivation-the  "need for 
cooperation." 
Economic motivations for cooperative membership fall into three categories: 
When marketing costs are lower with a cooperative, 
When cooperative marketing  reduces marketing  risk and uncertainty faced by risk- 
averse farmers, and 
When selling prices are higher with a cooperative. 
In the model below, an economic motivation is treated as a difference in transactions 
costs. Superficially, this is a rather limited conception of what influences farmer choice, 
and appears to correspond to only the first of the three categories above. However, the 
concept of transactions costs is broader than just marketing costs, and all three 
economic motivations can be subsumed within a broad interpretation of the  transactions 
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Transactions costs can be defined broadly as costs incurred as a result of  a trans- 
action, such as  a sale or purchase of a good or service. Transactions costs include direct 
marketing costs (handling, transportation, storage, grading), but also include costs 
associated with information  - -  imperfections in a transaction-searching  for a buyer or 
seller, negotiating  and enforcing contracts, and-costs associated with risk sharing 
between buyer and seller (Karantininis and Zago, 2001).l 
The reduction in expected utility as a result of  increased risk or uncertainty about 
market security has exactly the same impact as an increase in marketing costs. In the 
context of  cooperatives,  and in order to reflect the third item on the above list of 
economic motivations, it  is helpful to include as  a sort of "negative" transaction cost the 
effectiveness in bargaining a higher price through exercise of  market power. In the 
following section, T is used to refer to transactions costs. In light of the above discussion 
of the economic reasons for cooperative membership, it may be useful to note that T is 
the sum of three components: T = MC + RP - PP, where MC represents the ordinary 
marketing costs, RP  is the  risk premium (or dollar value) associated with marketing risk 
and uncertainty, and PP is the price premium negotiated by a cooperative with market 
power. 
The model below examines the situation in which transactions costs are different for 
a farmer who joins a cooperative and an otherwise identical farmer who does not join. 
Cooperatives may have marketing cost advantages over investor-owned  marketing firms 
for avariety of reasons. Farmers may share information more readily with cooperatives, 
thereby reducing informational asymmetries. If a higher degree of trust exists between 
cooperative management and members, cooperatives may benefit from lower contract 
enforcement costs and lower costs of contract negotiation. Peer monitoring may be less 
costly than other forms of monitoring. [See Sykuta and Cook (2001) for a fuller discus- 
sion of transactions costs advantages of  cooperatives.] Cooperative members may pay 
lower "risk premia" (lost expected utility resulting from marketing risk and uncertainty) 
if the cooperative provides a more secure market for the farmer members. Cooperatives 
may also generate marketing power that increases the price paid for farm commodities 
by a processor. As noted above, in the context of this model, the impact of a higher price 
paid to the cooperative is indistinguishable from the impact of a lower operating cost for 
the cooperative. 
Basic Assumptions 
Consider a population of N farmers. Each farmer has a fured output to sell and has 
incurred a fixed production cost.2  The farmers can form a cooperative and market their 
output  jointly, or each farmer can individually market output. Each farmer must decide 
whether to join the cooperative or not. The activity of  marketing farm output entails 
transactions costs. The cooperative undertakes some of the marketing activities for the 
farmer members, and therefore alters  the transactions costs of the farmer. Consequently, 
It may be useful to expand the definition of transactions costs to include costs associated with avoiding certain trans- 
actions by vertically integrating to perform more activities within a single firm (Sexton, 1986). 
The foundations of "transactions costs literature" (Williamson, 1985;  Coase, 1937)  are based on the notion that firms will 
wish to minimize the sum of transactions and production costs. The assumption that production costs are fixed allows us to 
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there are  two possible transactions cost functions for a farmer: Tc(i,  m) is the transactions 
cost offarmer i if she  joins the cooperative (subscript c denotes cooperative membership) 
and if the cooperative has m members; Tn(i,  m) is the transactions cost of farmer  i if she 
does not join the cooperative (subscript  -  -  n denotes nonmembership) and if the cooper- 
ativi has m members. 
ASSUMPTION  1. Farmers are heterogeneous in their transactions costs for individual 
marketing [see Karantininis and Zago (2001)  for a further discussion of  farmer heter- 
ogeneity]. Farmers are ordered whereby farmer 1  has the highest transactions cost, 
farmer 2 has the next highest, and so on. Thus, Tn(l,  m) > Tn(2,  m) > ... > Tn(N,  m). Why 
do farmers differ in their transactions costs when they market as individuals? Low- 
transaction-cost farmers may live close to a concentration of  buyers, or have internet 
access, or have an educational or experience advantage. 
ASSUMPTION  2. All cooperative members are treated the same, i.e., Tc(i,  m) = Tc(  j, m) 
= Tc(m)  for all i and j  who choose to join the cooperative. This is a fundamental tenet of 
cooperative organization. 
ASSUMPTION  3. As cooperative membership increases, transactions costs for members 
decline, or Tc(m)  > T,(m + 11, for all m. There are two possible explanations for this. A 
cooperative may have economies of  size in marketing. For example, a cooperative 
manager can make a series of  telephone calls and market the output of  10 farmers, or 
can make the same telephone  calls and market the output of 25 farmers; the transaction 
cost per farmer declines as  the number of farmers  increase^.^ A second explanation has 
to do with market power. The cooperative's ability to command a higher price from 
buyers may increase as the cooperative's membership increases. Note: This requires a 
view of transactions costs that is expansive enough to include (as  a negative component) 
the success in searching for or bargaining for the highest possible price. 
ASSUMPTION  4. As cooperative membership increases, transactions costs for non- 
members increase, or Tn(i,  m) < Tn(i,  m + 1)  for all i and m. This assumption reflects a 
competition in marketing between the cooperative and the independent farmer. As the 
cooperative grows in membership,  the costs to the independent (nonmember)  farmer of 
finding a buyer and negotiating the highest possible price in~rease.~ 
ASSUMPTION  5. For ease of  exposition and solution, transactions costs are linear: 
and 
(2)  Tn  =c  +d(m - 1) - ei. 
In a model of monopolistic competition,  where the existence and functions of firms is endogenous, all hs  will operate 
at a point where average costs are declining. See Leathers (2005) for an example of a model where market development is 
endogenous. 
A reviewer points out that as cooperative membership increases (and if the cooperative has sdlicient market power to 
increase price),  revenues to both cooperative members and nonmembers may increase. In order for assumption 4 to hold, the 
(negative) marginal impact on nonmember marketing costs must exceed the  (possibly positive) impact on nonmember 
revenues. Recall, however, that the assumptions  here demonstrate  conditions under which cooperatives  may form when the 
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A Cooperative All Farmers Join 
The above assumptions create a situation in which the formation of a cooperative has 
a cascade effect.-As the cooperative grows in size, its average costs decline (i.e., its 
-- 
market power increases and it more fully exploits size economies), and the costs of 
remaining outside the cooperative increase (i.e., it becomes harder and harder for the 
independent farmer to find a buyer). Under some circumstances, this cascade effect will 
sweep all farmers into membership in the cooperative. Two additional assumptions 
create a situation in which all farmers join the cooperative. 
ASSUMPTION  6A. The farmer with the highest independent transaction cost (farmer 1) 
gets higher returns as a result of  formation of  the cooperative, expressed mathemat- 
ically as Tc(m  = 1)  c  Tn(i  = 1, m = I), or c > a + e.  (Recall, farmers have been sorted so 
that the lower the index number i, the higher the transaction cost for independent 
marketing.) Therefore, this assumption states that at least one farmer wants to join a 
cooperative, even if she is the only member. The notion of a "one-farmer" cooperative is 
admittedly artificial. 
ASSUMPTION  6B. For any individual,  the increase in Tn - Tc caused by adding one more 
member exceeds the difference in non-cooperative transactions costs between farmer 
i + 1  and farmer i. Mathematically, this means b + d > e. 
Later in the paper, assumptions 6A and 6B will be relaxed or modified, without 
changing the  fundamental character of the  model. Assumptions 6A and 6B are  sufficient 
to ensure that the equilibrium will have all farmers joining the cooperative. A farmer's 
decision about whether to join the cooperative is based on whether her revenue, net of 
transactions costs,5  is higher as a member or as a nonmember. Farmer i will join if: 
where m is the equilibrium number of cooperative members. 
There are two pivotal steps in showing the equilibrium. First, assumptions 3 and 4 
are sufficient to ensure that: 
(3)  if R - Tc(i,  m) 2 R - Tn(i,  m) for m, 
then R - Tc(i,  m*)  2 R - Tn(i,  m*)  Vm"  m; 
and second, assumptions 6A and 6B are sufficient to ensure that: 
(4)  R - Tc(i,  i) 2 R - Tn(i,  i), 
since  Tn(i,  i) - Tc(i,  i) = c  + d(i - 1) - ei - a + b(i - 1) 
The first term in parentheses is positive by assumption 6A, and the second term in 
parentheses is positive by assumption 6B. 
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The "everyone joins" equilibrium is an equilibrium because joining is the dominant 
strategy6  for all farmers. For farmer 1,  joining is dominant since, by (4), 
R - Tc(l,  1)  2 R - TJl, I), 
and by (3), 
R - T,(1, m)  2 R - Tn(l,  m), for any m > 1. 
Therefore, for farmer i = 1,  joining is a dominant strategy. Farmer 2 makes the decision 
with the knowledge that  farmer 1  will join regardless of what other farmers choose (i.e., 
farmer 2 knows her decision will not affect farmer 1's decision, because farmer 1's choice 
is  a dominant strategy).  Joining is  the dominant strategy for farmer 2 also, since, by (4), 
R - Tc(2,  2) 2 R - Tn(2,  2), 
and by (31, 
R - Tc(2,  m) 2 R - Tn(2,  m), for any m > 2. 
Likewise, for all farmers 1,  ...,  N,  joining is the dominant strategy. In  equilibrium, all N 
farmers have  joined the cooperative, and farmer i's revenue net of transactions costs is 
denoted by: 
Even Though Everyone Joins, Some Cooperative Members May Be Unhappy 
One surprising aspect of this equilibrium is that some farmers who voluntarily join the 
cooperative would be better off if the cooperative had never been formed. If the cooper- 
ative were never started, farmer i's transactions costs are  calculated as  T,(i, m = O), and 
thus revenues net of transactions costs are: 
A farmer is better off with no cooperative if (6) exceeds (5), or if 
For some values of  the parameters, ie exceeds N, in which case all the cooperative 
members are happier with the cooperative than without it. 
Nevertheless, the  possibility exists that  some (but  not all)  of the  cooperative members 
are actually made worse off by the formation of the cooperative. If there are  some farmers 
of this type (if i*  < N), then the proportion of dissatisfied farmers is expressed as: 
which gets larger as  c and b get smaller, or as  a,  d,  and e get larger. 
A dominant strategy is one that is the best choice regardless of what other players choose (see Dixit and Skeath, 1999, 
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Cropp's (1994) survey of cooperative members found there is a substantial degree of 
dissatisfaction among cooperative members. However, the dissatisfaction described 
in this paper (comparing the actual cooperative to the theoretical position if no 
cooperative  - --  had ever been formed) is unlikely to be the same as the dissatisfaction 
registered  in Cropp's  survey. The surveyed farmers complained  about poor  or 
unreliable service by the  cooperative, or about the cooperative's method of allocating 
profits to farmer-members. By focusing on the simplest kind of  marketing cooper- 
ative, our model side-steps a number of  issues regarding asymmetric information and 
ownership rights, such as  those discussed by Menard and Klein (2004)  or Hendrikse and 
Bijman (2002). 
Even Though the Cooperative Is Formed, Aggregate Transactions Costs 
May Be Higher with the Cooperative than Without It 
What is  more, there is no guarantee that the cooperative provides a net benefit to its 
members in the aggregate. Using (5)  and (6), the aggregate revenue net of transac- 
tions costs with the cooperative exceeds the aggregate revenue without the cooperative 
if: 
If less than half of the farmers are dissatisfied with the cooperative (i.e., if o  < 1/21, then 
this inequality (8) will hold: 
N-i* -l  -  o=--  c-d  -a+b(N-1)  1 
N 
< -9 
Ne  2 
1  1  c-d  -a +b(N-l)>  -Ne  = --(N+l)e. 
2  2 
However, if more than half of the farmers are dissatisfied with the cooperative, then 
the possibility exists for inequality (8) to be reversed-i.e.,  the formation of the cooper- 
ative has a drain on aggregate net income of farmers. The interesting implication of the 
above is that cooperatives may exist in situations in  which aggregate transactions costs 
are not minimized by the cooperative's existence. Thus, under these assumptions, 
Sexton's (1986, p. 214) commonsense conclusion-"a  stable coalition structure must 
provide benefits at least as great as those attainable under any alternative group 
configuration"-may  not hold. The following two sections show how this result can be 
retained while relaxing assumptions 6A and 6B. 674  December 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
A Cooperative Some Farmers Join 
and Some Do Not Join 
It is easy to find situations in which one or more farmers in an area fail to join a local 
cooperative.  el&^  assumption 6B yields a model where some farmers do not join the 
cooperative in equilibrium. 
-(c -a  -e)  -(c -a  -e)  ASSUMPTION  6B'.  >b+d-e>  for some i"~  (1, N). 
i  **  iw-1 
Here we maintain assumption 6A, so (c - a - e) > 0. Assumption 6B1,  which allows 
(b +  d - e) to be negative, but not too negative, is a relaxation of assumption 6B which 
requires (b + d - e) > 0. Assumption 6B' implies that for farmers with a relatively 
strong propensity to join the cooperative (farmers indexed i  i"*  ), Tn(i,  i) - T,(i, i) 
> 0; and for other farmers, Tn(i,  i) - Tc(i,  i) < 0. An equilibrium exists in which i* 
farmers join the cooperative and N - i**  remain as independent marketers. 
The possibility raised in the previous section continues to exist here. Some farmers 
who join the cooperative may actually be better off without the cooperative. Those 
farmers cannot reestablish the "before the cooperative" position by dropping out of the 
cooperative: the costs of independent marketing are increased by the existence of the 
cooperative, whether or not the specific individual farmer chooses to join or not. And 
obviously, the farmers who refuse cooperative membership are hurt by the formation 
of the cooperative, since their costs of independent marketing increase. 
Preemptive Commitment to Join or Not Join 
Another possibility is that the cooperative can thrive if those who gain the most from 
cooperative membership are able to stake out a preemptive commitment to join no 
matter what others do. In this case, assumption 6A (a + e - c < 0) can be replaced with 
a different set of assumptions 6A': 
ASSUMPTION  6A'. Relaxing 6A (c - a - e > 0), we now let c - a - e < 0, but require 
that c - a - e > e - b > d - b. Thus, assumption 6A' implies a - b - c + 2e < 0, and 
d - e < 0. Here, the assumption of c - a - e < 0 means that person 1  will not want 
to form a one-person cooperative. 
However, if the cooperative formation game is viewed not as a simultaneous choice 
game described above, but as one in which farmers move sequentially, with farmer 1 
acting first, followed by fanner 2, etc., we see that this weaker condition is sufficient to 
create the cascade into universal membership. To observe this, consider farmer N's  deci- 
sion and work backward. If all N - 1  farmers acting before farmer N have committed to 
join the cooperative, then farmer N will join if Tc(i  = N, m = N) - Tn(i  = N, m = N - 1)  < 0: Leathers  Cooperative Efficiency and Voluntary  Membership  675 
The first expression in parentheses is negative by assumption 6A1,  and the second 
expression in parentheses is positive by assumption 6B. 
Next consider farmer N - 1's decision, given that all N - 2 farmers acting before have 
committed to join the cooperative. If farmer N - 1  joins, she knows farmer N will also 
join, so transactions costs will be Tc(i  = N-  1, m = N). If farmer N - 1  fails to join, trans- 
actions costs will be at a minimum Tn(i  = N - 1, m  = N - 2). Farmer N - 1  will join the 
cooperative if Tc(i = N - 1, m = N) - Tn(i  = N- 1, m  = N-  2) < 0: 
Equation (10) uses the d - e < 0 part of assumption 6A1.  Generally, for person N - n, the 
difference is AN + n(d - e) < 0. 
Therefore, person 1, knowing that all other farmers will join the cooperative if she 
takes the  lead in forming one, will form a cooperative, even though this individual would 
not want to join a cooperative in which she was the only member. 
Implications and Concluding Comments 
A common rule in economics is that freedom of action leads to efficiency of result. In  the 
literature on agricultural marketing cooperatives, this rule has been explored from two 
directions. The implications of  freedom of action in establishing and joining a cooper- 
ative have been examined by Karantininis and Zago (2001), and Sexton (1986). The 
notion that institutional arrangements such as cooperatives will emerge to deal with 
information problems in an efficient way has been investigated by Sykuta and Cook 
(2001). In light of  this general economics rule, and especially in light of  the "new 
institutional economics," it seems logical to expect that, with voluntary membership, 
cooperatives will arise  if and only if they can contribute to aggregate economic efficiency, 
by reducing the aggregate transactions plus production costs of farmers. 
This paper sounds a cautionary note regarding this apparently logical conclusion. 
Even with freedom of choice (i.e., farmers are free to join or not join the cooperative), 
and even when each farmer makes this decision to maximize her own wealth, a cooper- 
ative can emerge and dominate even when cooperative marketing is less efficient in the 
aggregate. Specifically, in a situation where increased cooperative membership simul- 
taneously reduces average costs to members and increases transactions costs of 
nonmembers, the possibility exists for farmers to be swept along into cooperative 
membership even when a majority offarmers (and farmers in the  aggregate)  would have 
lower costs if the cooperative did not exist. 
The principal difference between the model adopted in this paper and those used in 
other analyses in the cooperative literature is that here we explicitly consider the effects 
on other farmers of  one farmer's decision to join the cooperative. Our model demon- 
strates that taking this interaction into account can radically change the conclusion 
about whether freely formed cooperatives are efficient. This study therefore has 
implications for both strands  of the cooperatives literature.  Explorations of the impacts 676  December 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
of voluntary cooperative membership and discussions of the existence of cooperatives 
as  efficient institutional arrangements should consider whether interactions among the 
decisions of farmer members are relevant to those studies. 
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